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Abstract - This paper reviews the outcome of a state electoral reform initiative in 
terms of the four-stage behavior change process used by social marketers to 
gauge the effectiveness of their techniques. While the Clean Elections initiative 
was moderately successful in its Action and Contemplation stages, the author 
argues that realization of its full potential could be significantly hastened by 
utilizing the social marketing tools of segmentation, communications research 
and pretesting. 
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Relevance to Marketing Educators, Researchers and/or Practitioners  - While  
the Clean Elections initiative was moderately successful in its Action and 
Contemplation stages, the author argues that realization of its full potential 
could be significantly hastened by utilizing the social marketing tools of 
segmentation, communications research  
Introduction 
Marketing is about facilitating exchange between at least two parties, both of 
whom must perceive that the benefits of participation outweigh the costs. In 
commercial marketing, a successful exchange results in profit for the marketer. 
In social marketing, success is defined in terms of measurable behavior change 
that helps solve a social problem, improve a social condition, or otherwise aid 
society at large. 
New Jersey’s 2007 pilot program of public financing for legislative 
campaigns, known as Clean Elections, can be viewed as a social marketing effort 
that met with moderate success. But a number of challenges were exposed in the 
course of the effort that help explain why efforts in 2009 to renew it were 
unsuccessful.  Analyzing these challenges from a social marketing perspective 
may help advocates to overcome them, not only in relation to Clean Elections, 
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but also in the interests of other ambitious and well-meaning social change 
initiatives. 
Background 
To the extent that policy planners have heard of social marketing, it is 
frequently understood as little more than public service advertising. This is not 
surprising in view of early scholarship in the field, most of which characterized it 
simply as a tool to promote and enhance the appeal of a social idea (Kotler and 
Roberto1989).  
But to equate social marketing with advertising alone is to both oversimplify 
it, and to seriously underestimate its potential to achieve the more ambitious 
goal of behavior change. Indeed, its strongest contemporary advocates take the 
position that there is no social marketing success without action. A seminal 
paper by Kotler and Zaltman (1979), generally credited with launching social 
marketing as a distinct discipline, explicitly called for active implementation and 
control of its programs in the marketplace. As defined by Andreasen 2002, 7): 
“What makes social marketing potentially unique is that it (1) holds behavior 
change as its ‘bottom line,’ (2) therefore is fanatically customer-driven, and (3) 
emphasizes creating attractive exchanges that encourage behavior.” 
Importantly, he and other contemporary scholars also stress that effective social 
marketing focuses not only on the benefit side of the proposed exchange – 
convincing the target audience that the transaction will improve their lives – but 
also on minimizing its real or perceived costs. 
As currently and comprehensively defined, a social marketing campaign 
should encompass certain tactics and techniques that are common to commercial 
marketing campaigns. These include doing consumer research and pretesting to 
help develop communication materials; segmenting target audiences; 
customizing the four P’s (product, price, promotion, place) as much as possible; 
and attending to competing behaviors. Social marketing can also be 
implemented simultaneously with other change strategies. For example, social 
marketing can complement programs of structural change, which target laws 
and institutions instead of (or in addition to) individuals. Its messages can be 
effectively targeted not only to individuals or segments of citizens, but also to 
policy makers and other stakeholders (Hastings et.al. 2000). 
Both in planning the campaign and evaluating outcomes, it is helpful to 
think of the behavior change sought in social marketing not as a single 
occurrence but as a process. The four stages of this process include: 
 
(1) Precontemplation – initial consideration of the behavior 
(2) Contemplation – evaluation of the behavior 
(3) Action – engaging in the behavior 
(4) Maintenance – reinforcing and continuing the behavior 
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Clean Elections in New Jersey 
In the last decade, New Jersey has been plagued by a wave of public corruption. 
Some of the criminal behavior has been linked to the high cost of running for 
office in the state; because of its location, New Jersey candidates are largely 
dependent on the expensive New York and Philadelphia media markets. To raise 
campaign cash, public officials have been caught engaging in thievery, bribery, 
extortion and kickback schemes. Voter anger and disgust with the political 
process have been manifested, in part, by electoral turnouts well below 40% in 
legislative races. 
On common practice is known as “pay to play.” It is technically legal though 
generally perceived as unethical. Candidates take outsize campaign 
contributions from companies and professionals who seek public contracts, then 
deliver those contracts in a quid pro quo that is usually difficult to prove but 
believed to exist at every level of government. Most experts agree that “pay to 
play” ultimately burdens taxpayers with subpar, overly expensive public 
services, an outcome dubbed New Jersey’s “corruption tax.” 
Clean Elections, a program of public financing for legislative campaigns, 
grew out of public clamor for an end to “pay to play.” The idea is that 
participating candidates receive a fixed, predictable amount of money to run 
their races, in return for rejecting all contributions from businesses or lobbyists 
and any amount greater than $10 from individual donors.  
Three other states have recently mounted legislative Clean Elections 
programs: Arizona, Maine and Connecticut. Vermont has a program, but it is 
limited to gubernatorial candidates. In 2012, New Mexico and North Carolina 
offered public funding in campaigns for the judiciary and for certain statewide 
offices (National Conference of State Legislatures 2012). While cross-state 
comparisons are difficult because of wide variations in structure and funding, 
New Jersey’s effort was, on most measures, the most complex and expensive at 
the time (New Jersey Citizens Clean Elections Commission 2007; Levin 2006). 
New Jersey’s first trial run of Clean Elections took place in 2005, in two 
election districts. To qualify for public funding, candidates were required to 
obtain 1500 contributions of either $5 or $30 in less than three months. There 
were a myriad of restrictions on the collection process, plus a set of reporting and 
disclosure rules so unwieldy that almost no one in the program could follow 
them. In the absence of adequate publicity, voters were ill informed and 
confused. In the end, only two of ten prospective candidates met the 
requirements to participate, and the experiment was generally judged a failure. 
A vastly simplified Clean Elections pilot was tried again in 2007, in three 
districts. Candidates were required to obtain only 800 contributions, all in the 
amount of $10. A $600,000 public education program was mounted. This time, 
all nine prospective clean candidates qualified for the funding. 
Cleaning Up Dirty Politics Atlantic Marketing Journal |  66 
 
Voter attitudes in the Clean Elections districts were assessed via a public 
opinion poll, fielded by independent university pollsters during the two months 
preceding the election. Results indicated that voters in these districts had higher 
levels of awareness and information about the legislative campaigns than voters 
elsewhere in the state. Additionally, they were more likely than other voters to 
cite issues, rather than personalities, as the focus of the campaigns (Woolley and 
Vercellotti 2007). 
A Social Marketing Perspective on Clean Elections 
 
From a social marketing perspective, the program’s goals were doubly 
challenging. This is because its advocates sought not just one but two kinds of 
behavior change. 
 
(1) For the candidates to qualify for public funding, it was necessary for 800 
voters in each candidate’s district to come forward with $10 donations. 
(Traditional campaign fundraising relies on much larger donations from a 
small pool of donors, many of whom live outside the candidate’s district.) 
(2) For the program to show that it helped restore faith in the political 
system, it was necessary – or at least highly desirable – for voter turnout 
to improve in the clean districts, as compared to same-district turnouts in 
comparable elections 
       
On the first criterion, the 2007 program can be judged a success. All nine 
prospective candidates were able to collect enough small donations to qualify. 
 
But on the second criterion, the program fell short. As compared to 2003 (the 
most recent comparable election, with no gubernatorial or federal candidates on 
the ballot), turnout went up in one clean district, but either declined or stayed 
the same in the other two clean districts. In one of the clean districts, turnout 
fell below the 2007 average across all districts in the state. 
With only fragmentary attitudinal and outcomes assessment – there were, 
for example, no exit interviews with voters or longitudinal measures of attitude 
change – it is difficult to analyze and compare the various influences on Clean 
Elections. But it is possible to suggest at least a rough picture of what happened. 
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Results: Implementation of Social Marketing Tactics and Techniques 
In two ways, the 2007 Clean Elections pilot made effective use of social 
marketing tactics and techniques.  
First, the program effectively managed the 4 P’s to maximize the benefits 
and minimize the costs of the desired behavior changes among voters. 
 
 Product: Publicly funded legislative campaigns were associated with a 
bundle of benefits compelling to a corruption-weary electorate. These 
included more honesty in politics and government; less tax money 
siphoned off by public corruption; and more power vested in the individual 
voter to influence an election and be taken seriously by candidates. 
 Price: The costs of participation were minimized. Donations to the 
candidates were capped at $10. Paperwork was greatly simplified as 
compared to the 2005 pilot.  
 Promotion: Promotional materials included direct mail; print, radio, 
television and internet banner ads; and a new “Clean Candidate” ballot 
designation for participants – arguably, a form of distinctive, attention-
getting packaging. 
 Place: Virtually no effort was necessary to learn about or contact the clean 
campaigns, as information was mailed to registered voters, posted on a 
state government website, reported in local news media and publicized by 
all nine participating candidates. 
       
Second, attention was paid to competing behaviors. The target audience was 
reminded, often and in multiple venues, that public nonparticipation would 
mean a continuation of “dirty politics” as usual. More specifically, Clean 
Elections was consistently described as a pilot program which would not be 
repeated if it failed to show promising results.  
However, some fundamental social marketing tools were not used. There 
was no effort to segment target audiences; to use consumer research in the 
development of communication materials; or to conduct any form of either 
pretesting or post-testing.  
Discussion: Issues and Outcomes by Stages of the  
Behavior Change Process 
 
Precontemplation: An inherent weakness at this early stage was the fact that 
the 2007 clean districts were different from the 2005 clean districts. Had they 
been the same, there might have been some carryover in awareness and 
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comprehension of at least the goals of the program. Instead, advocates were 
starting from scratch in their efforts to encourage initial consideration.  
Contemplation:  Evaluation was facilitated by a public education effort far 
more extensive than in 2005. There were advertisements, direct mail to voters, 
and in-depth website information, designed and managed by the New Jersey 
Election Law Enforcement Commission. In addition, because nine candidates 
qualified for the funding – and did so early in the election season – these 
candidates themselves generated much publicity and offered many opportunities 
for people to ask questions about Clean Elections. However, in the absence of 
any communications research, it is impossible to gauge whether the materials 
were maximally effective -- and if not, whether the shortcomings were in 
comprehension, retention, believability or overall message strategy.  
The failure to segment target audiences was a still more fundamental 
stumbling block. This is for a reason obvious to marketers but not necessarily 
clear to government agencies: some voters are likely to be significantly more 
aware of and interested in political reform than others. Even among those who 
are aware, many citizens may be too cynical to believe that Clean Elections can 
make a difference. There is little point in one-size-fits-all promotional materials 
that will motivate a few voter segments but be dismissed or ignored by others. 
Had an effort been made to identify the most receptive audience, it may have 
been more cost-effective and productive to target extra mailings and other 
communications to that smaller group than to spread the available promotional 
resources thinly across the entire universe of registered voters.  
Action(s): Regarding Action #1, enough $10 donors came forward for all the 
prospective candidates to qualify. This was a critical improvement over 2005, 
when such action was seriously hampered by its costs: specifically, the difficulty 
of obtaining forms and deciphering the rules for participation. In 2007, these 
costs were minimized with downloadable, shorter forms and other 
simplifications. For example, while the 2005 program allowed donations of either 
$5 or $30 and required personal bank checks, 2007 donations were solely in the 
amount of $10 and could be paid in cash or by credit card. Regarding Action #2, 
voter turnout in the clean districts did not markedly improve. In social 
marketing terms, this suggests that few people (relative to the total population 
of registered voters) perceived a greater benefit or increased efficacy in going to 
the polls in a clean election than in a traditional election. It is reasonable to 
conjecture that all voters in the clean districts felt better about participating 
than they might otherwise have felt, but there is no data to quantify such an 
effect.  
  Maintenance: Reinforcement and continuation of Clean Elections is 
dependent on future structural change by the New Jersey Legislature. But 
public enthusiasm – or lack thereof – is one factor that can sway legislative 
decision-making. 
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Implications for Social Marketing                                  
While social marketing approaches have spread to a wide range of government 
agencies and non-for-profit organizations (Andreasen 2002), the Clean Elections 
experience suggests that policy planners on the state level still have limited 
understanding of its principles and potential. There is appreciation of the need 
to translate program characteristics into consumer/voter benefits, and to reduce 
the costs/inconveniences of participation. But the absence of communications 
research or audience segmentation may impede behavior change on a broader 
scale. As noted by Hornik (2002), this is not a new problem; in the public health 
field, a wide range of social marketing campaigns have fallen short because of 
insufficient attention to implementational detail. The challenge for social 
marketers: to make explicit and compelling for non-marketers the connection 
between analysis and action. 
On the positive side, the experience shows that it is possible to induce 
significant progress in one stage of the behavior change process even while 
falling short or encountering unforeseen obstacles in another. On one Action 
measure – participation of $10 donors – there was clear success in 2007 
compared to 2005. During the Contemplation stage, too, polling evidence of 
heightened awareness among voters indicates that the 2007 public education 
materials and message had some effect, however imperfectly that effectiveness 
was tracked. 
More broadly, the failure of Clean Elections to boost electoral turnout should 
remind social marketers in all spheres that, as pointed out by (Rothschild 1999, 
28), “Free choice, apathy and inertia are powerful competitive forces that often 
are ignored…For every choice there is an alternative. In a free-choice society, 
many laws are not followed if the target cannot discern the reward in doing so.” 
Even when laws, education and marketing are jointly and deliberately brought 
to bear on the high-profile problem of political corruption, there is no guarantee 
the public will be easily or rapidly motivated to switch its longtime “brand” of 
behavior. 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
Reviewing Clean Elections in terms of stages of behavior change suggests that 
desired outcomes – heightened voter turnout, restoration of faith in the political 
process – could be hastened by bolstering the program during Contemplation 
and Maintenance. In a period of fiscal crisis and state budgetary cutbacks, it is 
unrealistic for advocates to expect the New Jersey legislature to immediately 
reauthorize Clean Elections; in particular, there is little chance that allocations 
to the program would be increased solely for marketing purposes. In the future, 
however, when the program expands across the state, some promotional funds 
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may become available from clean candidates who collect more than the required 
800 small donations and are willing to turn those funds back to the program.  
To enhance the number of people who contemplate participation in Clean 
Elections – as donors, voters, or both – segmentation research could be designed 
to identify voter subgroups most responsive to electoral reform. Promotional 
messages could then be pretested to determine how the benefits of Clean 
Elections are perceived by those segments most likely to act on the messages. 
In a social marketing analysis of disaster preparedness and lessons learned 
from Hurricane Katrina (Guion et.al.2007, 7), the authors note: “Successful 
marketing communications campaigns emphasize the importance of frequency in 
creating knowledge. Thus, attention should be paid to programmatic 
dissemination of messages and the identification of opportunities for reminders.” 
This point is equally relevant to Clean Elections. Instead of waiting until a few 
months before any given election to promote the program’s benefits and urge 
participation, reminder messages and educational materials could be bundled 
with other government communications and made available year-round in 
libraries and state offices. They may also be disseminated by such independent 
advocates as the League of Women Voters, Citizen Action and Public Interest 
Research Group. 
Maintenance of Clean Elections is largely a function of legislative decision-
making, but social marketing techniques can help to build relationships between 
program proponents and legislators. Indeed, some social marketing scholars 
explicitly cite relationship-building as a legitimate goal and a form of behavior 
change in itself (Hastings, forthcoming). Moreover, the clean candidates elected 
in 2007 can present themselves and their legislative records, both to their 
colleagues and to the public, as tangible “products” of the program. To the extent 
they are perceived as effective champions of the cause of ethics reform, an 
argument can reasonably be made that in the long term, Clean Elections has 
real potential to improve government as well as politics. 
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